Going into the illegal war against Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump had four key goals: regime change, ending Iran’s nuclear program, eradicating Iran’s missile program, and cutting Iran off from its proxies. He promised that all four would be achieved quickly without compromise: “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!”
Iran did not surrender, and there has been plenty of compromise in making a deal. Not one of those four goals was accomplished on the battlefield. And little more was won at the negotiating table. That does not mean that extending the ceasefire under the compromise terms is a bad thing. The war was harming the United States, Iran, the region, and the world. Continuing it would have harmed them worse. It was necessary, as it has been necessary for a long time, to end the interminable American hostility to Iran on realistic terms.
On June 17, a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran was signed by the presidents of the two countries. It is premature to pass judgement on the final agreement because the Memorandum is an outline that lacks important details that will be worked out during the sixty days or more of more difficult and technical negotiations that has now begun. The centerpiece paragraph 8 on Iran’s nuclear program, for example, says only that they “agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon” and that they “agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment.”
It is impossible to evaluate the agreement until resolutions are agreed upon: what grade Iran will be permitted to enrich uranium to, how long the suspension of enrichment will be and whether some or all of Iran’s nuclear facilities will be dismantled.
But it is crucial to note that Trump’s key goal going in, an Iranian promise never to acquire a nuclear weapon, is unchanged from before the war, and his key goal going out, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, is potentially worse than before the war.
Paragraph 1
The first paragraph ends the war. It claims that not only the United States and Iran, but “their allies in the current war” declare an end to military operations. That it claims to speak for “allies” is interesting, and controversial. Iran had no allies.
Importantly, the Memorandum clearly specifies that the agreement ends the war “on all fronts, including Lebanon.” Seemingly for the first time, the current agreement adds that it ensures “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon,” seemingly implying that Israel has to pull back its forces from Lebanon. When Israel struck Beirut the second time, the U.S gave Iran additional concessions in exchange for not retaliating and jeopardizing the Memorandum. One wonders if this was the additional concession.
Paragraph 2
The second paragraph contains two promises that have never passed between the United States and Iran before: the promise to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the promise not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
From cyber attacks to bombs, the U.S. has a long history of not respecting Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As for interfering with Iran’s internal affairs, remember that the crisis between the U.S. and Iran began with a coup in 1953 and ended with incitement to regime change in the current conflict.
Getting the American president’s signature on this promise is historic for Iran.
Paragraph 3
This paragraph establishes a maximum sixty-day period for arriving at a final deal. It is interesting for three reasons. The first is that the second round, with its detailed and technical agreements will be much more difficult than the first with its general agreements. Sixty days is not very long.
The second is that Trump threatened that if Iran “misbehaves,” he will “go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head.”
But the third relaxes the environment a bit with the caveat that the “maximum” isn’t really a maximum: it is “extendable with mutual consent.”
Paragraph 4
This paragraph is important because it signals the beginning of the end of the economic strangulation of Iran for the first time in years and the beginning of the economic recovery that will finally improve the lives of the people of Iran.
It promises that “immediately upon the signing” of the Memorandum, the U.S. will begin the dismantling of its naval blockade. Iran will be free to import and export. That promise has already begun to take effect with a rise in the number of commercial vessels passing through the strait.
The paragraph further states that following the signing of a final deal, the U.S. will remove its forces “from the proximity” of Iran.
Paragraph 5
This paragraph promises a reciprocal Iranian opening of the Strait. The intriguing point here is that it requires Iran to allow safe passage “with no charge for 60 days only.” That is the first suggestion that Iran may see the realization of its demand to charge a fee for transiting the Strait as part of a final agreement. That would be an important concession by the United States and a major new source of revenue for Iran that would allow it to diversify beyond its reliance on oil exports.
Again, suggesting that the Strait of Hormuz could stay under some kind of Iranian management after the war is the stipulation that Iran “will conduct dialogue” with Oman to “define the future administration” of the Strait. On June 23, Oman and Iran announced “a joint working group” on the management of the Strait. They emphasized “their sovereignty and sovereign rights over their territorial waters in the strait.” They committed to keeping the Strait open and safe while, notably, discussing “the future administration of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the services to be provided there and the associated costs.”
Though Trump had identified the opening of the Strait as a key goal, the Strait had always been open before the war. This paragraph could leave Iran in a much more advantageous position than before the war.
Paragraph 6
Like paragraph 4, this paragraph opens the gates for money to flow into Iran to repair the economy and the infrastructure that was decimated during the war. It promises a remarkable $300 billion reconstruction plan.
Trump has insisted that there will be no American investment, and that the money would come from other sources, including, the private sector and, perhaps, the Gulf states. Trump has defended the massive inflow of cash to Iran by saying that American missiles inflicted so much damage on Iran that “Somebody’s going to have to help them out.”
Paragraph 7
A key part of the deal for Iran is the promise that, as part of the final deal, the U.S. will “terminate all types of sanctions.” This is what Iran was supposed to receive for the limitations and inspections placed on their nuclear program under the JCPOA nuclear agreement. Liberation from sanctions is a huge gain for Iran.
Paragraph 8
This paragraph is the one Trump has said is the only one that matters. But Iran did not affirm that it “shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” Iran “reaffirms” it because it has affirmed it many times before. Tehran made the affirmation legally binding when they signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Agreement. And, though Trump says that the JCPOA “was a road to a Nuclear weapon for Iran” and that “Our Deal is a WALL against Iran ever having a Nuclear weapon,” that is not true. The very first paragraph of the JCPOA states that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.”
The careful wording is important because if this is the major accomplishment Trump is claiming, it commits Iran to nothing it has not consistently committed to before.
Paragraph 9
This paragraph creates a window to bargain in good faith with Iran maintaining the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States assuring that, during negotiations, there will be no new sanctions or U.S. forces in the region.
Paragraph 10
This paragraph parcelled together with paragraphs 4, 6 and 7, holds out the promise of tremendous economic recovery for Iran. It promises that from the moment the Memorandum is signed until all sanctions are ended that Iran will be permitted to export oil. On June 22, the U.S. Treasury Department waved sanctions on Iranian oil exports during the 60 day negotiations, meaning that Iran can export oil at market rates.
Paragraph 11
The eleventh paragraph tops off the economic promise of the Memorandum for Iran. It commits to negotiating the procedure to make all of Iran’s frozen funds—of which there may be as much as $124 billion to $167 billion—available to it. There are reports that Iran has already been promised that $6 billion of frozen assets held in Qatar will be released.
Paragraph 14
After two administrative paragraphs, the final paragraph is important to Iran. The cancellation of the JCPOA and the U.S. bombings during negotiations have left Iran with a deep distrust of America and a fear that the new nuclear agreement could have the same fate as the old one. The promise of this paragraph that “the final deal will be endorsed by a binding U.N.S.C. resolution” offers Iran some reassurance.
The war won the United States none of the goals it sought. Several of them are not included in the Memorandum: there is no mention of Iran’s missile program and there is no mention of Iran’s proxies. The U.S. negotiated with the regime instead of replacing it, and Iran gave a promise on nuclear weapons that it has already given.
Iran will likely be forced to suspend its nuclear program and to dilute its 60% enriched uranium. But uranium was enriched to 60% as leverage precisely to get a deal like this. Having done its job, Iran is ready to dilute it.
And, depending on the length of the suspension on enrichment, Iran may be, reluctantly, willing to do that as well. The first several of those years would have been spent rebuilding the damaged program anyway. And as Barbara Slavin, distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, told the Libertarian Institute, Iran is not only willing to suspend enrichment to win access to their frozen funds, the reconstruction funds and an end to sanctions, but they have also learned the powerful lesson that the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz gives them way more leverage than adding another centrifuge or increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium ever did.
The war was a crime that killed over 3,000 Iranians, thirteen Americans, set back improving relations between Iran and its neighbors, damaged America’s international reputation, devastated Iran and the Gulf nations and destroyed the environment. The Memorandum reverses none of that and accomplishes few of America’s goals. It delivers a deal that could have been made without the devastation of war. This is a war that should never have been fought. But the Memorandum has the virtue of ending it instead of continuing the war and making things far worse. For that, it should be celebrated.
