Why is it so important for the U.S. to take and retain control of the Strait of Hormuz? No matter what else, why is this the only real nonnegotiable with Iran?
At first glance the nonnegotiable seems to be Iran’s nuclear program. This raises the question of what might be left of the program after massive bombing by the U.S. and Israel. The media makes much of the fact that some enriched uranium is supposedly still buried under one of the ruined sites, and of course no one should simply write off radioactive material in the hands of an adversary. But the more immediate concern is not what remnants of Iran’s nuclear program survived, but how easily any reconstruction effort could be detected from space and struck from a distance. That reality makes the nuclear issue containable. The genie is out of the bottle on bombing inside Iran, so any nascent efforts to reconstruct a nuclear program can be destroyed by the U.S. and Israel with little political fallout. It would be better if none of that had to happen, but it easily could, because agreement or no agreement, Iran does not have to play fair.
Understanding what the U.S. is really negotiating with Iran—the shifting of the balance of power in the Middle East—points to the one truly nonnegotiable term: the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway that must be open to shipping, free of violence, and free of tolls.
Granting control of the strait to Iran would set a catastrophic precedent. Would Houthi militants then try for formal control at the mouth of the Red Sea? What if Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, China or any of the other nation-states in the region lay claim to the Strait of Malacca? Never mind the Persian Gulf; over 94,000 vessels a year pass through the Strait of Malacca, making it the busiest strait in the world. It carries about 25 percent of the world’s traded goods, including oil, and Chinese manufactured products. For decades China has referred to the “Malacca Dilemma,” the fear that rivals could blockade this narrow, vital energy route, so it could be time to act. Just this week (coincidence?) China deployed ships to tighten control of the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, roiling tension with the Philippines. And what about the Taiwan Strait, or any of the world’s other commercial chokepoints?
Since the days of the Barbary pirates, one of the core jobs of the United States Navy has been safeguarding global freedom of navigation, a principle that underpins international trade and economic stability. By maintaining a forward-deployed presence in key maritime chokepoints and with carrier groups in all oceans, the Navy ensures sea lanes remain open in accordance with international law. No one nation comes close to being able to play such a role. European sea power has not been able to do so since the collapse of the British Empire, and China still lacks the global blue-water navy and extensive world-wide base network to try.
At present China is willing to benefit from this stable maritime order without contributing much to it. Yet a world where it appears the order is breaking down, such as if Iran remains in control of Hormuz, could press China to act. While China still lacks naval reach, it may already be capable of asserting control over regional chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca, especially if it concludes the existing maritime order is eroding. For its own self-interest (oil) China also could expand diplomacy and arms sales to the new toughest kid on the Gulf block, Iran. Elsewhere, the Gulf states and maybe even allied countries in East Asia will have to soften ties with the U.S. in recognition of the new regional power of Iran.
But we don’t need to cede control of the Strait of Hormuz. Forcing it open is a military objective for which the Pentagon has planned for decades, and has in some form already been done twice. The Trump White House will remember in 2019 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard threatened to close the strait. It sabotaged four oil tankers in the United Arab Emirates and damaged two others with mines. But in the end Iran backed away from the fight. It could not afford a potential blockade of its oil exports along the lines of Venezuela. The U.S. can blockade the Strait at low cost in the Arabian Sea, away from Iranian interference. Iran also knows while it could harass and frighten, it can not seal the strait to all traffic in the face of a massive U.S. Navy deployment. This would morph from asymmetrical warfare Iran could execute, to peer-to-peer fighting, which if the U.S. was willing to escalate to, Iran could not survive.
Even more instructive is the Iran–Iraq “Tanker War.” Between 1984 and 1988, oil tankers and merchant vessels became targets for Iran in a campaign designed not to defeat an enemy navy but to strangle the Iraqi economy. After an unsuccessful gambit to reflag Kuwaiti tankers as American to warn off the Iranians, a change in American tactics neutralized the Iranian threat. The United States shifted from escorting tankers to confronting Iranian forces directly. The turning point came in April 1988, after a U.S. frigate struck a mine in the Gulf. The ship survived, but the incident triggered a massive American retaliation. In Operation Praying Mantis, U.S. helicopters disabled an Iranian ship laying mines, and sank three other Iranian boats. Navy warships shelled Revolutionary Guard bases and Iranian oil platforms. SEALs destroyed a platform as well. Navy and Marine elements would go on to selectively destroy multiple targets. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) now in the Gulf would be able to carry out a similar strategy.
Having gone this far, the U.S. may need to go further. This power struggle between Washington and Tehran has been going on for a long time. This most recent round follows an emboldened Iran who watched the United States destroy or greatly weaken its two major enemies, Iraq and the Taliban, clearing both Iran’s eastern and western borders at no cost to Tehran. The American public went on to lose its taste for war, and Iran’s nukes fell off Washington’s once-sweeping martial agenda in the Middle East. Iraq became an Iranian subjugate even as Iran expanded its proxy fighting in Lebanon, knowing the U.S. had had enough.
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It would be strategically devastating at this point for America to follow the regional empowerment of Iran through its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan by handing over a global lever of control. This regional, multi-generational power struggle is not a problem that will be solved in a single negotiation or a single conflict. But one principle must remain constant: The Strait of Hormuz cannot become a bargaining chip. If it does, the consequences will extend far beyond the Middle East, reshaping the global order in ways the United States may not be able to reverse.
Old sayings resonate in the Middle East. “The rug is never sold” reminds marketplace negotiators that no deal is ever final; there is always more to extract. That is useful context if U.S. officials sit down again with the Iranians for another bite at the apple. But amid the expected give-and-take, one issue must remain nonnegotiable: keep the Strait of Hormuz open.
