Among critics of “wokeness,” an increasingly heated debate has emerged about what should be done about university disciplines shaped by postmodern-derived Critical Social Justice theories—most notably Gender Studies. Some argue that these fields should be dismantled entirely. Others believe they should be reformed to operate under the normal standards of academic inquiry.
The Reform vs. Abolition Debate
The term “woke” originated in Black American history to describe awareness of real and widely recognized systemic injustice, as in being alert to the very real oppression going on in society. In its contemporary usage, however, it has expanded to refer to a theoretical framework in which social injustice is understood to be embedded in the assumptions and biases we are all said to have been socialized into, but be largely unaware of—White supremacy, patriarchy, colonialism, and cis/heteronormativity. Critics have adopted the term disparagingly because it reflects the central problem with this framework: that its adherents believe themselves to possess a critical awareness of hidden systems of power, while those who question them are implied to remain asleep.
Throughout history, ideological movements convinced of their own correctness have adopted similar assumptions. They begin with the premise that they are right and then seek ways to explain away why this is not evident to everybody else. Rather than accept disagreement as legitimate and engage with it, they devise frameworks, which hold that others are ignorant or willfully oblivious. We see this in religious traditions, in which nonbelievers are described as blind while converts are said to have “seen the light,” and in contemporary culture through concepts such as being “red-pilled”1, 2 (drawn from The Matrix), in which only those who have awakened can perceive reality as it truly is.
The core problem with this epistemology is that it renders itself unfalsifiable and impervious to critique or self-correction. Criticism is preemptively dismissed as further evidence of its central claim: that most people remain blind to social reality. Critics broadly agree that such circular reasoning is incompatible with rigorous academic inquiry. Universities exist to produce knowledge, which requires supporting hypotheses with evidence, accepting attempts at falsification, and engaging in open scholarly critique. Where critics differ is in how to respond when academic disciplines fail to meet these standards. Some argue that such fields should be reformed to meet them, while others believe they should be dismantled altogether.
Gender Studies as a Test Case
Many identity-based academic fields draw on these theories, but many recent debates have focused on Gender Studies, which provides a useful test case. In considering whether it should be reformed or abolished, two questions are especially important.
First, are the subjects it addresses—sex, gender, and sexuality—important aspects of human life, about which it is valuable to develop reliable knowledge and careful ethical reasoning? Given that human beings are a sexually dimorphic, sexually reproducing species, I submit that the answer is yes.
Second, what kind of intellectual environment is most likely to produce that knowledge and ethical reasoning? One possibility is a reformed university environment that upholds viewpoint diversity, interdisciplinary research, high evidentiary standards, and robust critique. The alternative is to remove the subject from academia altogether, leaving discussion of these issues largely to ideologically homogeneous alternative spaces.
Since the problems within Gender Studies emerged from the dominance of a single theoretical framework, and that dominance has produced poor scholarly outcomes, reforming the field to meet the standards of rigorous academic inquiry seems the better option. The core issue is not whether the study of sex, gender, and sexuality should exist, but whether any single theoretical framework should be insulated from the standards of evidence and critique that define academic inquiry. Indeed, reforming the field and displacing its current theoretical framework may ultimately be the same project.
This debate reflects a broader philosophical and epistemological divide across contemporary culture between those who prioritize individual liberty and plurality, and those who seek to impose a single vision of the common good on everybody. Do we want to preserve a society in which individual liberty, viewpoint diversity, and the free exchange of ideas are valued? And do we believe that such a society provides the best way to discover truth, reconcile differences, and consign bad ideas to the dustbin of history?
A Case Study: Simovski and Haltigan
The conflict between the “reform” and “abolish” positions was recently illustrated in a disagreement between Nicole Barbaro Simovski, a social scientist and Director of Communications at Heterodox Academy, and J.D. Haltigan, Professor of Developmental and Evolutionary Psychopathology. In “Viewpoint Diversity vs. Women’s and Gender Studies,”3 Simovski addresses the problem of academic departments that have become ideologically dominated by Critical Social Justice theories. She considers the debate over whether such fields should be required to introduce greater viewpoint diversity or dismantled altogether, and argues for the former approach. As she concludes:
The most pressing question facing higher ed—and its leaders—right now is not necessarily whether ideologically homogeneous departments should be preserved as-is or dismantled altogether (though we’re seeing the latter already in some places), but whether universities are willing to do the harder work of reopening them to genuine inquiry. Viewpoint diversity is not just a box-checking exercise; rather it is a requirement for knowledge production and teaching. When it is absent, disciplinary progress stagnates, students unenroll, and the door is opened for political actors to step in to resolve the problems universities have avoided.
Simovski’s proposal is to bring different approaches to the study of sex, gender, and sexuality into dialogue so that competing hypotheses can be tested against each other through normal scholarly processes. Haltigan responded bluntly, “[This is] the problem with Heterodox Academy in a nutshell. You don’t introduce viewpoint diversity into something like ‘Gender Studies.’ You abolish it. It is not science. It is not knowledge. It has no place in the university.”4 Here, Haltigan is likely referring to the “Critical” theoretical framework that currently dominates the field, rather than to any study of sex, gender, or sexuality. But Simovski’s argument is precisely that opening the field to more rigorous forms of critical inquiry would allow those topics to be studied in ways that meet normal academic standards.
Simovski replied by arguing for the value of bringing different disciplinary approaches into dialogue. For example, biological evidence about the distribution of sex traits could be examined alongside sociological analyses that attempt to explain why theories of a “sex spectrum” arise. Doing so allows scholars to consider the strongest version of the “spectrum” claims while also presenting the case for a sex binary grounded in biological evidence. In her view, excluding either sociological or biological approaches would simply shut down inquiry rather than advance understanding.5
A framework that regards evidence, reasoned argument, and falsifiability as tools of oppression cannot participate in the processes through which universities produce knowledge.
There is, of course, a profound difference between empirical sociological research that studies the different beliefs people have about sex, gender, and sexuality, and Gender Studies rooted in Queer Theory that is opposed to such rigorous sociological research on principle. In her piece, Simovski does not go into detail about what it might look like in practice to bring together scholars working within these very different epistemological frameworks. I will consider that question below. Simovski’s concern is instead the broader principle of interdisciplinary collaboration and viewpoint diversity.
The problem is the theories, not the subject.
On that broader principle, I agree with Simovski. Fields addressing sex, gender, and sexuality should be opened to genuine critical inquiry and include scholars from relevant disciplines. These are complex subjects that intersect with multiple areas of scholarship. Biology is central to the study of sex and reproduction; evolutionary and cognitive psychology can illuminate questions about psychological sex differences; sociology helps us understand how different groups conceptualize sex, gender, and sexuality; and philosophy offers competing frameworks for addressing their ethical dimensions, including gender-critical feminism and social conservatism.
However, I also agree with Haltigan that the theoretical framework currently defining Gender Studies cannot be sustained under the normal standards of academic inquiry. This is not simply one perspective among many whose claims can be weighed against competing hypotheses. To the extent that postmodern-derived theories, including Queer Theory, reject the possibility of objective knowledge, treat evidence, reason, and debate as instruments of oppressive power, and resist falsification, they do not meet the basic criteria by which academic claims are evaluated. A framework that regards evidence, reasoned argument, and falsifiability as tools of oppression cannot participate in the processes through which universities produce knowledge.
My own stance on theories such as Queer Theory is informed by having studied them intensively for 17 years, both inside and outside the academy. These approaches are often deliberately obscure and counterintuitive, which means that many people support or oppose them on the basis of political alignment rather than a clear understanding of their claims. Yet when those claims are made explicit, they can be assessed against the same standards applied elsewhere in academia.
Many people, for example, assume that supporting the rights of same-sex attracted and gender-nonconforming individuals requires endorsing Queer Theory. In fact, most people in those categories do not subscribe to it, and many object strongly to being “queered.” Historically, greater social acceptance of homosexuality and gender nonconformity emerged alongside the development of biological and psychological research, which treated these traits as natural variations within a sexually reproducing species, rather than as moral or political categories.
By contrast, Queer Theory interprets sex, gender, and sexuality through political and discursive frameworks. It seeks to destabilize categories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation and to understand them chiefly in terms of power relations and identity. In doing so, it rejects the biological foundations of sex, and demands affirmation of gender identity as a form of political activism in place of empirical inquiry to discover what is true, or philosophical debate to consider what is ethical. It can plausibly be argued that this shift has undermined earlier progress toward social acceptance—an empirical and philosophical question best examined within a reformed academic environment where competing arguments can be tested.
This is precisely why the positions associated with “reform” and “abolition” are not, in fact, opposed. Opening this area of study to genuine viewpoint diversity would not preserve these theories in their current form; it would require them to defend their claims under conditions in which those claims can be tested. To the extent that they cannot meet those conditions, they will not endure.
Reform as the Most Effective Way to Abolish Bad Ideas
What would it actually mean to open Gender Studies to genuine critical inquiry? Two basic requirements would be necessary:
- genuine viewpoint diversity and
- a clear expectation that scholars acknowledge competing hypotheses and respond to criticism in accordance with normal academic practice.
The study of sex, gender, and sexuality is not inherently illegitimate, and opening it to rigorous inquiry would mean including scholars from disciplines that examine these subjects using established methods, including biology, psychology, sociology, and relevant philosophical frameworks. Scholars would be expected to present their claims alongside competing explanations and respond directly to criticism—standard practice across academia, where hypotheses are proposed, alternatives considered, and evidence weighed through ongoing debate.
Under these conditions, students would encounter a genuinely pluralistic intellectual environment. They could examine questions about sex, gender, and sexuality from multiple perspectives, while understanding how those perspectives differ and how well they are supported. Claims about the sexually dimorphic nature of humans, or about the nature of sexual orientation, or individual variation in traits considered masculine or feminine could be evaluated biologically. Questions about gender roles could be explored through evolutionary psychology, empirical sociology, gender-critical feminism, liberal individualism, or social conservatism.
Unlike fields such as biology, which are defined by a shared methodological framework, Gender Studies is a more conceptually open field concerned with the study of “gender.” As such, it has no clear basis for restricting itself to a single theoretical approach. Indeed, it emerged from Women’s and Feminist Studies and includes a long tradition of scholarship critical of the very concept of gender, making the exclusion of gender-critical perspectives particularly difficult to justify on academic grounds.
Scholars within Gender Studies would also be expected to engage with interdisciplinary critique of their own research or theoretical papers. It would not be acceptable to declare certain claims, such as those relating to gender identity “not up for debate,” or to dismiss skepticism of it as a denial of people’s right to exist, or engage in any moves to prevent knowledge claims from being tested and refined. The expectation would be that disagreement would be engaged with as it actually is. In Who’s Afraid of Gender?6 feminist and queer philosopher Judith Butler defines an “anti-trans ideology movement” and then declares it contradictory and incoherent. She does so by conflating socially conservative views that endorse traditional gender roles with gender-critical feminist views that reject them, even though these have been utterly opposed to each other for decades and, arguably, centuries.
It would be far more productive to examine these competing perspectives directly. Consider the value of an open debate between gender conservatives, who see gender roles as a natural expression of sex differences important to societal health; gender- critical feminists, who see them as oppressive social constructs harmful particularly to women; gender identity “queer” theorists, who argue that an internal sense of gender is ubiquitous and more fundamental than biological sex; and evolutionary psychologists, who recognize both significant psychological sex differences and individual variation, typically without drawing prescriptive conclusions.7 A university setting is precisely the place where such views can be compared rigorously, their assumptions examined, and their evidential support assessed.
Where better to undertake this kind of analysis than within a university’s Gender Studies department?
If such reforms were applied consistently, several outcomes would be likely. The most committed adherents of postmodern-derived queer theory would likely leave the field. Because their theoretical framework treats debate, evidence, and falsification as mechanisms through which “dominant discourses” maintain power, a system that requires open argument and engagement with competing evidence therefore conflicts with the ethics and epistemology of the theory itself. Rather than defending their claims under those conditions, many would likely choose to resign. They might present this as having been forced out, but since they had been welcomed to meet standard academic expectations, such claims would be less likely to persuade a broader audience or generate the kind of backlash that often accompanies perceived suppression.
Liberal societies create conditions in which disagreements can be contested through argument and evidence rather than through coercion and force.
Some might remain and attempt to defend their ideas in direct comparison with approaches grounded in biology, psychology, empirically rigorous sociology, or competing ethical frameworks. In that case, students and scholars would be able to assess clearly how those theories perform when subjected to the same standards of evidence and critique that apply elsewhere in academia. They are highly unlikely to fare well. Those who fear that simply allowing such ideas to be expressed will make them more persuasive may underestimate either the poverty and incoherence of Queer Theory or the ability of students and scholars to evaluate arguments critically.
This is how flawed ideas are properly and lastingly defeated.
Importantly, such a reform would also preserve intellectual fairness. On the possibility that critics are mistaken and have missed demonstrable valuable insights from Queer Theory, a reformed academic environment would allow it to demonstrate that. Theories that survive open scrutiny deserve to endure; those that cannot lose credibility.
Either way, the result would be the same: ideas about sex and gender would be evaluated through evidence and argument rather than protected through ideological insulation.
Why Censorship Backfires
There are always those who argue that allowing ideas to be expressed and debated strengthens them. This view rests on a strongly social constructivist assumption: that people are socialized into accepting dominant discourses uncritically. From this perspective, harmful ideas must be suppressed rather than challenged. Advocates therefore support banning, penalizing, or “no-platforming” views they regard as dangerous so that only approved perspectives are widely encountered.
This logic has long motivated Critical Social Justice activists seeking to control permissible discourse within universities, but it also appears among some of their opponents. Conservative activist Christopher Rufo, for example, has argued explicitly for emulating this strategy of Critical Theorists in order to replace “woke” discourses with conservative ones through institutional control.8
Those who value the free exchange of ideas for the purposes of knowledge production and conflict resolution reject this approach consistently. They argue that suppressing ideas violates freedom of belief and expression, and that bad ideas are best defeated by exposing them to criticism. Universities, in this view, are precisely the place where flawed ideas should be tested, debated, and, where necessary, dismantled. This is not a “soft” approach. It is precisely because I regard these theories as deeply flawed that I argue they should be exposed to open scrutiny rather than suppressed. Suppression protects ideas; scrutiny exposes them.
The historical record provides little support for the claim that censorship achieves its intended aims. As uncompromising free speech advocates Greg Lukianoff and Nadine Strossen argue in their paper “Would censorship have stopped the rise of the Nazis?”9 attempts to suppress extremist movements frequently have the opposite effect of strengthening them. Attempts to suppress ideas typically make them more attractive and give their proponents the glamour of being persecuted by the establishment for being the holders of The Truth “they” don’t want you to know. We see clear examples of this dynamic more recently.
Did the speech policing and cancellation tactics of the Critical Social Justice movement in the United States reduce racism and sexism or increase acceptance of gender identity? Or did they provoke resentment, contribute to the growth of alternative media spaces, and fuel an anti-woke backlash, alongside declining support for LGBT-related policies?10 The causes of Donald Trump’s election are complex and contested, but resentment toward identitarian activism is widely cited as a motivating factor. Even those who view his election positively would acknowledge that it was not the outcome intended by censorious activists.
Suppression protects ideas; scrutiny exposes them.
Similar questions arise in the United Kingdom. Did efforts to censor criticism of gender identity and immigration policy increase acceptance of trans identity and a more pro-immigration stance among the general public? Or did this lead to widescale resistance in which Britain became known as “TERF Island”11 while Reform, campaigning on an anti-immigration platform, rapidly gained unprecedented support and overtook the two established parties in popularity?12 Whatever one’s evaluation of these developments, they run counter to the aims of those advocating censorship.
It is, of course, possible to argue that these developments would have occurred regardless, or even more rapidly, without attempts to restrain them. But claiming that the rise of the antiwoke had nothing to do with resentment at the authoritarian tactics of the woke requires dismissing a large body of public reaction to overreach. At minimum, these cases provide disconfirming evidence for the position that censorship is a good way to make disapproved ideas go away.
The Authoritarian Cycle
One striking feature of this dynamic is that many critics of wokeness on the political right readily acknowledge that censorship by Critical Social Justice activists helped provoke the recent anti-woke backlash. Some go further, portraying right-wing illiberalism as simply a response to left-wing excess. Yet the reasoning often stops there. The likelihood that adopting similarly authoritarian tactics might produce a comparable backlash against them is rarely considered. There is little reason to think the dynamic that undermined the authority of the identitarian left would not eventually undermine their own movement as well.
One explanation may lie in a common psychological tendency: those deeply convinced of their own correctness often assume that, once opposing views are suppressed, others will eventually come to recognize the truth of their position. Their ideas, they imagine, will then remain dominant indefinitely—a belief that might be described as “real authoritarianism has never been tried.”
In reality, authoritarianism has been tried repeatedly. Throughout history, systems built on the imposition of a single ideological orthodoxy have tended to produce cycles in which one dominant ideology replaces another, each suppressing dissent until it is eventually displaced in turn. The only political arrangements that have shown any lasting success in interrupting this cycle have been liberal democracies. By protecting freedom of belief and speech and by building institutions that support viewpoint diversity, liberal societies create conditions in which disagreements can be contested through argument and evidence rather than through coercion and force.
Unfortunately, this insight remains deeply counterintuitive to many people. Advocating viewpoint diversity often provokes impatience or frustration. Liberal commitments to open debate are frequently caricatured as a kind of polite pluralism in which everyone expresses their opinions indefinitely while congratulating themselves on their open-mindedness and nothing ever gets resolved. From this perspective, insisting on viewpoint diversity appears to be a naive half-measure or an unwillingness to confront bad ideas decisively. It is often portrayed as an idealistic defense of abstract freedoms in a world where, many believe, material realities demand more forceful action.
I believe this is mistaken. While individual liberty certainly does matter as a principle in itself, and upholding it consistently is fundamental to protecting the founding principles of liberal democracies like the United States of America, there is also a strategic and pragmatic argument for defeating bad ideas with better ones. It works. If we compare Western liberal democracies, which have at least imperfectly protected individual liberty, open debate, and viewpoint diversity, with societies that have not—or with those same societies before they developed liberal democratic institutions—the advantages of this system become clear. Liberal institutions have proven far more effective at producing knowledge, resolving social conflicts, and advancing human rights.
Where do we go from here?
The United States now has a window of opportunity to reform its universities by opening disciplines captured by a single, deeply flawed ideology to genuine inquiry, interdisciplinary critique, and viewpoint diversity. Doing so would allow those theories to be examined and challenged in ways that are both legitimate and lasting.
Attempting instead to suppress such ideas would have the opposite effect. It would shield them from the scrutiny that universities are uniquely positioned to provide, removing precisely the conditions under which they would be forced to defend themselves against criticism—and ultimately fail to do so. Rather than losing credibility, they would be able to retreat while plausibly claiming persecution, a narrative that historically tends to increase both their glamour and public sympathy.
Should public opinion shift and a future election bring a different political party to power, those who attempted to suppress woke ideas may find they have unintentionally created ideal conditions for those ideas to return with renewed strength. More importantly, they will have helped entrench the norm that governments may determine which ideas are permissible within universities. If academic inquiry can be regulated by the state today to eliminate woke ideas, it can just as easily be regulated tomorrow to eliminate ideas that challenge a different political orthodoxy.
Universities would then find themselves in the extraordinary position of having the boundaries of legitimate scholarship shift with every electoral cycle. Institutions that are meant to produce knowledge would instead become instruments of whichever political faction happened to hold power at the moment.
That is not how knowledge is produced in a liberal society.
