First, a quick summary from today’s decision by Judge Amit Mehta (D.D.C.) in Mannina v. O’Keefe Media Group:
In January 2025, Plaintiff Jamie Mannina, then a federal defense contractor, went on what he believed were two genuine dates with a woman named “Heidi.” Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, “Heidi” was actually Defendant [redacted], a person hired by Defendants O’Keefe Media Group (“OMG”) and James O’Keefe to elicit from Plaintiff details about his political views and federal employment history and to film and record his statements. Defendants used this footage of Plaintiff to create videos and articles for a series called “Dating the Deep State,” which Plaintiff alleges paint him as a Pentagon official conspiring with other federal officials to undermine then-President-elect Donald Trump and his incoming administration.
The court held that Heidi, who was sued as one of the defendants, couldn’t remain pseudonymous:
Throughout this litigation, Defendants have maintained that [Heidi]’s name should be sealed…. Defendants … assert that [Heidi]’s true name must be kept under seal on the basis that her identity is protected by the District of Columbia reporter’s shield law. In the alternative, they argue that good cause exists under Rule 26(c) to maintain [her] pseudonym….
Defendants still have not shown [Heidi] is protected by the Shield Law. The District’s Shield Law prohibits the compulsory disclosure of “the source of any news or information procured by [a] person while employed by the news media and acting in an official news gathering capacity,” creating an absolute privilege for the identities of sources.
The court previously denied Defendants’ motion on the ground that they did not present any evidence—”not even a declaration”—to support treating as a source rather than as a journalist. Defendants this time come armed with a declaration from [Heidi], but the declaration only reinforces the court’s previous determination that [Heidi] is not a source within the meaning of the Shield Law.
In her declaration, [Heidi] states that she was motivated to pursue “undercover journalism” to expose corruption and promote transparency as to matters of public interest and explains that she was the one who “came up with the idea to film [Plaintiff] as a potential subject leading to important information for the public.” She was trained by OMG in the “techniques of undercover journalism,” and she received $7,000 from OMG after the publication of the videos and articles about Plaintiff “as an appreciation for [her] contribution,” describes her activities as “collecting … recordings and making observational notes,” “provid[ing] all this raw information to OMG’s team,” and “answer[ing] their questions about context,” and she compares herself to “prior undercover journalists.” Defendants refer to [Heidi] in their motion to dismiss as a “citizen journalist” or “undercover reporter,” and her activities as “undercover newsgathering,” And they describe [Heidi]’s relationship with OMG and O’Keefe as a “working relationship” wherein [Heidi] was “employed or contracted” by Defendants “to conduct an investigation of people like Mr. Mannina, and in the course of that employment she carried out the undercover news investigation.” The list goes on. All of these activities suggest [Heidi] was working for OMG and O’Keefe and was not a source.
Nothing in the declaration makes [Heidi] any more comparable to the protected “source” in Grunseth v. Marriott Corp. (D.D.C. 1994), which Defendants again cite to support their position. [Heidi]’s collaboration with OMG and O’Keefe does not at all resemble the leaking of internal records by a non-party employee of the defendant company in Grunseth. The Shield Law therefore is not a basis on which [Heidi] can proceed pseudonymously….
As for Rule 26(c), the court is not moved by Defendants’ conjecture about the harassment may face if her identity were unsealed. Rule 26(c) permits a court to, with “good cause,” withhold from the public certain information “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” In this circuit, courts balance five “non-exhaustive” factors to determine whether a party may proceed anonymously:
- whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature;
- whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
- the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
- whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,
- the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Because proceeding under a pseudonym is a “rare dispensation from the court,” the party seeking pseudonymity “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its own name.” “Speculative assertions of harm will not suffice.”
Defendants chiefly focus on the second factor. They argue that public disclosure of [Heidi]’s name may invite harassment. Defs.’ PO Mot. at 9–12. [Heidi] attests that she fears [various things, all of which are redacted -EV].
Though the court is sympathetic to [Heidi]’s anxieties, that is not enough to continue to proceed under a pseudonym. Defendants admit that “[n]o specific threat has been made against her yet”—only that she “could” be doxed or “could” suffer reputational or emotional harm. Defendants have not “provide[d] evidence that psychological damage or violent threats are anticipated if” [Heidi]’s identity is disclosed. [Heidi]’s fears about [redacted] is entirely speculative. And though she alleges [redacted], she does not claim any threatened violence or harm. Even [redacted] is not enough, for “[m]ere embarrassment and harassment”—much less the mere possibility of them—are “insufficient to demonstrate the sort of retaliatory harm necessary to satisfy this showing.” … “[R]equests to proceed anonymously have been denied where the [party] merely cites personal embarrassment as the basis of the need for confidentiality.” And Defendants have offered nothing but speculation that there was [redacted].
Perhaps continued pseudonymity would not materially prejudice Plaintiff, who is now aware of [Heidi] ‘s identity. But “[l]awsuits are public events.” And “[i]dentifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness.” The public interest in open judicial proceedings “is a legitimate reason to requiring unsealing” [Heidi] ‘s name.
The other factors either do not weigh in favor of anonymity or fail to tilt the balance in that direction. [Heidi] is a private party, but she is not a minor, and this case does not involve sensitive or highly personal matters, see In re Sealed Case II (D.C. Cir. 2020) (listing as examples of “sensitive or highly personal matters” “sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors”). And the fact that [Heidi] engaged in First Amendment–protected journalistic activities also is not reason alone for this court to grant the “rare dispensation” of pseudonymity. On the contrary, by volunteering to work with OMG and agreeing to dupe Plaintiff knowing that her efforts could be published by OMG on the internet and thus reach a worldwide audience, she accepted some risk that her identity would be uncovered through litigation or otherwise.
The court therefore denies Defendants’ motion for a protective order. [Heidi] must proceed as a defendant in this case like any other under her true name and identity. The court, however, is amenable to a protective order keeping under seal [Heidi]’s address and contact information. The parties may jointly propose a protective order with that narrowed scope.
You can also read posts about the substance of the court’s analysis of the libel claim, the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, and the wiretapping claim.
