When President Donald Trump declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security in a January 2026 Executive Order, the designation was accompanied by a series of sweeping claims. Among them were accusations that Cuba “provides support” to Russia, China, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, that it “supports terrorism,” and that the Cuban government supports actors who “seek to destroy the United States.”
What began as a discussion over Cuban intelligence capabilities has now expanded into a much broader narrative that presents Havana as a link between America’s foreign adversaries, militant organizations, and domestic political movements. And the claims have only continued to grow.
At the center of the debate are concerns over Cuba’s intelligence facilities and potential cooperation with foreign adversaries. Commercial satellite imagery has shown development at Cuban intelligence sites, including the Bejucal facility near Havana, where analysts have identified construction consistent with expanded signals collection capabilities.
The discussion quickly shifted from the capabilities identified through satellite imagery. In May 2025, Fox News reported that Republican lawmakers were increasingly concerned that Chinese-linked facilities in Cuba could serve as a platform to “monitor U.S. military movements” and “disrupt critical communications.”
The article highlighted warnings from House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rick Crawford (R-AR) and a letter from House lawmakers Mark Green (R-TN), John Moolenaar (R-MI), Carlos Giménez (R-FL), and Sheri Biggs (R-SC), who argued that suspected Chinese-linked sites could eventually function as a “forward operating base” for electronic warfare and intelligence collection against the United States.
While such facilities could potentially enhance Cuba’s ability to monitor U.S. military and communications activity in the region, analysts have noted that there is no public “smoking gun” directly linking these sites to Chinese intelligence operations, despite repeated U.S. claims of Beijing’s involvement.
In May, Axios reported that U.S. officials believed Cuba had acquired hundreds of military drones and discussed potential drone warfare scenarios involving U.S. interests in the region, including Guantánamo Bay and possibly Key West.
Those allegations were later repeated in a White House report on Cuba’s security threat, which cited The Jerusalem Post and echoed claims of Iranian drone transfers and military consultations. Notably though, the claims rely on anonymous U.S. intelligence sources and the original Axios reporting, while neither the media reports nor the White House assessment provided publicly available evidence independently verifying the allegations.
This sequence of events brings to mind Operation Northwoods, a 1962 Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal that explored staging attacks and attributing them to Castro’s Cuba as a justification for military action. Unlike the Axios allegations, Operation Northwoods was a documented proposal and, while never carried out, showed the lengths governments would go to manufacture pretexts for military action.
The Axios report itself included several caveats that complicated its claims. Despite the headline, “Exclusive: U.S. eyes attack-drone threat from Cuba,” the article stated that “U.S. officials don’t believe Cuba is an imminent threat” and that “no one’s worried about fighter jets from Cuba.” Perhaps the most significant admission was that the intelligence could “become a pretext for U.S. military action.”
The timing is worth mentioning: after the administration described Cuba as a national security emergency, alleged it was assisting U.S. adversaries, and warned of potential drone threats, CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Havana to deliver a message that cooperation was possible only after “fundamental changes,” while invoking the January operation that removed President Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela.
The allegations were immediately disputed by both Havana and Moscow. Cuban officials accused Washington of creating a “fraudulent narrative” to justify additional pressure, while Russian officials denied that Cuba had purchased hundreds of military drones from Russia and Iran.
Neither government response proves that the Axios allegations are false, but the dispute highlights an issue: the public evidence behind the most significant claims remains unavailable.
By July, the alleged drone threat had moved beyond intelligence reporting and into political advocacy. United Against Nuclear Iran displayed an Iranian Shahed-136 drone in Coral Gables, Florida, warning that Iranian military technology in Cuba could threaten the United States.
Speakers at the event, including former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Rep. Carlos Giménez, emphasized the drone’s capabilities, including its reported explosive payload and range, arguing that such systems could theoretically reach targets as far away as New York and that large-scale drone attacks could overwhelm existing defenses.
However, the exhibit demonstrated only that Iranian drone technology exists—not that the displayed drone came from Cuba, that Havana possesses Shahed-136 systems, nor that Cuba has the capability or intent to use such weapons against U.S. targets. Even coverage of the event relied on claims that “reports” indicated Iranian drones were present in Cuba, rather than presenting evidence from Cuba itself.
The narrative continued to expand with a July 20 State Department report titled Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism, which argued that “Havana had solidified its place as the ideological capital of the modern radical left.”
The document points to figures such as Twitch streamer Hasan Piker and participants in Cuba solidarity movements as evidence of an influence network. While these individuals openly support engagement with Cuba and criticize U.S. policy, the analysis provides no evidence that they are acting as agents of the Cuban government or participating in a coordinated influence operation.
The claims also extend to domestic politics, arguing that “many of the most significant upheavals in recent American political history—from the George Floyd riots to the rise of Antifa to protests on college campuses—can be linked, in some way, shape, or form, to Cuban influence.”
Of note, the document does not provide evidence that Cuba directed, funded, or coordinated these movements. Instead, it appears to treat ideology, criticism of U.S. foreign policy, and participation in Cuba solidarity efforts as evidence of an influence network.
The report also states that China and Russia have “tripled” their intelligence personnel in Cuba since 2023. That claim traces back to a Wall Street Journal report citing unnamed officials familiar with U.S. intelligence assessments, rather than publicly available or declassified intelligence.
None of this is to say that Cuba does not pose legitimate security concerns. Havana has a history of espionage, intelligence operations, and alliances with U.S. adversaries. The question though is if this history should influence the claims now being made about Cuba.
The conclusion this document reaches goes beyond just intelligence concerns. Rather than simply describing Cuba as a hostile foreign government, it presents Havana as a network of activist groups, nonprofits, universities, and domestic political movements with an agenda. The claims presented make many allusions without providing evidence that Cuba directed, funded, or controlled these movements.
Claims this broad require clear evidence. The history of disputed intelligence assessments including Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, “yellowcake” uranium, and mobile biological weapons programs, are just a few examples where assertions were made while evidence remained lacking or fabricated.
With Havana recently rejecting the State Department report as “propaganda,” only time will tell whether the allegations presented in this document lead to a change in U.S.-Cuba policy or if it will become just another chapter in the decades-long rivalry between Washington and Havana.
