Image by Marissa&Eric.
Middle East professor of political science Oren Barak explains Lebanon as a fragile state and how the ongoing conflict with Israel exacerbates the region’s destabilization. Groups such as Hezbollah will continue to exist if the basic conditions that led to their emergence continue.
The geopolitical landscape of Lebanon has been greatly impacted by the threat of regional hard power. In this interview, exclusive to CounterPunch, Oren Barak, the Maurice B. Hexter Chair in International Relations at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, explains how institutions, non-state actors, and historical conflicts impact both peace and security. As Israel engages in more and more illegitimate state violence amid the war with Iran, greater regional conflict could spin out of control in Lebanon and Syria. Barak’s insight and the Rational Actor Model explains how only diplomacy can prevent complete devastation and achieve a proper desired outcome.
Daniel Falcone: Your research looks at the Israeli state after 1967 and Lebanon after 1920. How do these examples from history explain present-day Lebanon? To what extent is Israel using arguments, or the politics of the past, for long-term security when the offensives are really conducted for expansion?
Oren Barak: In both cases, Israel after 1967 and Lebanon after 1920, the state’s expansion was justified in existential terms, that is, as means to prevent the annihilation of the ethnic or national community. This was because the existing pre-expansion borders were seen as insufficient to prevent genocide. Recall that Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister, argued in the UN after the 1967 war that, “The June [1967] map is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger. I do not exaggerate when I say that it has for us something of a memory of Auschwitz.”
Therefore, Jewish leaders in Israel and Maronite Christian leaders in Lebanon argued that their communities needed “secure” or “natural” borders that would guarantee that its members would “never again” be slaughtered. But this was an illusion. The new territories were inhabited by people who did not belong to the community, and who rejected their forced inclusion into the state.
In Israel, the same logic has become predominant since October 7, 2023. The existing borders, especially with Gaza, but also with Syria and Lebanon, are seen as insufficient to prevent enemy attacks against Israel, or the “White Toyotas” scenario. Therefore, the argument is that Israel must seize/occupy lands beyond its border. These lands, moreover, should be forcefully emptied by their inhabitants and all houses and buildings should be demolished. The argument is that only such a strategy of “scorched earth” can guarantee Israel’s long-term security. But this, too, is an illusion. The state’s expansion elicits armed resistance from the other side, Hamas, Hizbullah, and most international actors reject Israel’s actions. But over and above, Israel does not have sufficient power to uphold these new borders.
Daniel Falcone: In your book on the Lebanese Army, you researched its transition from a sectarian institution into a power-sharing one on behalf of Lebanese civil society. How did that change impact the understanding of the role of the military in nation-building as a form of resistance?
Oren Barak: Traditionally, militaries were seen as institutions that integrate, and even mold together, members of divergent groups in society. However, what I demonstrate in my book is that divided societies such as Lebanon, which are marked by deep cleavages between their communities (ethnic, national, and regional), militaries, while promoting national, even supra-ethnic values, identities, and historical narratives, also reflect these basic social divisions.
This is mainly because no community can allow the military, and the other security services, to become monopolized by other communities and become an instrument of ethnic oppression. The result is a somewhat paradoxical outcome, reflected in the book’s title, The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society. The military serves as an instrument, or tool, of nation-building, but at the same time helps solidify sub-national identities. But in divided societies, I really don’t see a viable alternative.
Daniel Falcone: Further, in your piece, The Case for Averting War Between Israel and Hizballah, you point out how that military force will not eliminate Hezbollah. Can you talk about how diplomatic methods for protecting states are the more sustainable path in stopping the worst of conflict? Who is more defiant of this tactic, Netanyahu or Trump?
Oren Barak: Military force alone cannot eliminate violent non-state actors such as Hizbullah and Hamas. These actors will continue to exist so long as the basic conditions that led to the emergence of these actors do not change dramatically. In Lebanon, this refers to the lack of effective state authority over all its territory — especially in South Lebanon, but also to the socioeconomic deprivation of many Shi’ite Muslims, who see Hizbullah as their patron and champion. If the people do not have viable alternatives, which, in my view, only the state can provide, they will continue to support actors such as Hizbullah. The same is true about Hamas, although in the Palestinian Territories, the situation is different because there is no state.
I think that the tragedy of Israelis, Palestinians, and Lebanese is that the current Israeli government, but also previous ones, have not only abandoned the diplomatic state-oriented path but also de-legitimized it completely. This is one important common denominator between Netanyahu and Trump — both hate states, international institutions, international law and international norms, and see diplomacy as the weapon of the weak. For them, the only way to survive in a hostile world is to project and use power or money, to buy off their opponents. However, for Trump the economic factor of “business” is more important than the use of military power, and this can explain the actual and potential disagreements between the two leaders when the use of military force results in a major economic crisis as in the Gulf.
Daniel Falcone: Trump made very outrageous statements regarding Iran, perhaps knowing a ceasefire was imminent. Despite this, JD Vance and Netanyahu insist that ongoing Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon are peripheral acts. First, how are they part of the larger war ecosystem, and what lessons from your research argue for the promotion of stability to strengthen all states involved?
Oren Barak: Well, it became clear that Lebanon, which became embroiled in the US-Israel-Iran war, is closely linked to the “bigger” ceasefire between the US and Iran. I hope that Israeli-Hizbullah violence will not undermine the US-Iran ceasefire and the prospects of reaching a long-term agreement, which is really the only way to prevent future conflicts.
Daniel Falcone: Reports show hostile levels of substantial state violence coming from the onslaught of Israeli strikes in Lebanon. The Iranians are issuing warnings that these attacks violate the ceasefire. How do you see the inevitable escalation? Are there any regional strategies or actors that can help strike a balance to stop the killing?
Oren Barak: Israel has agreed – quite reluctantly and under US pressure – to limit its attacks in Lebanon and to hold direct talks with Lebanon in the United States. There is a major opportunity here, especially in view of the positions of Lebanon’s current government (especially President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam) and their open rejection of Hizbullah’s claim to be a “resistance” and not an (illegitimate) militia that needs to be disbanded. I truly hope that Israeli Lebanese negotiations will commence and that they will be successful. I also hope that they will address the issue that I mentioned earlier, namely, the lack of effective state authority over all its territory in Lebanon, and especially in the Israeli-Lebanese border area.
