This report traces how Russia sustains its war in Ukraine by recruiting foreign nationals, many of them deceived or coerced, through a global pipeline of social media advertisements, intermediaries and disposable websites. It centres on a recent investigation by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which uncovered a coordinated digital infrastructure behind this recruitment drive.
The Kremlin has faced challenges in recruiting personnel for its war against Ukraine. With monthly casualties around 30,000, many Russians are reluctant to fight. During Russia’s partial mobilisation in 2022, hundreds of thousands of citizens – officially 261,000 and up to 700,000 according to other sources – fled, causing the authorities to suspend the measure. Since then, the military mostly relies on volunteers, criminals pardoned in exchange for fighting, and foreign recruits. A system has been established to lure individuals worldwide into signing up for the Russian military, with over 28,000 foreigners from 135 countries involved by late 2025. The EEAS investigation mapped out part of this digital pipeline, tracing thousands of adverts and dozens of websites to a few organisations and recruiters.
Tracking Russia’s digital recruitment backbone
Investigators found numerous recruitment ads for the Russian armed forces on Meta, WhatsApp, and at least 35 websites in up to 40 languages, such as Indonesian, Thai, Malay, Arabic, Wolof, French, and Spanish. These collectively show a recruitment network aimed at engaging potential recruits worldwide while hiding the true sponsors and, in many instances, the nature of the work being promoted.
By monitoring sponsored ads on Facebook, the investigation uncovered a coordinated campaign spanning four continents. African audiences were first targeted in June 2026, with a pivot to Latin American users (including diaspora communities in Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria) by July, before expanding into Southeast Asia by month’s end. At the time of writing, 85 paid ads focused on Russia’s military staffing had appeared on Meta platforms and had been flagged to the company. Currently, 78 of them are no longer accessible.
Image 1: Number of new recruitment domains registered per month.
Image 2: (L to R) Misleading poster targeting African users and redirecting to recruitment portals; Example of ads linking to a disposable domain used for redirection to recruitment portals; Page branded as legitimate recruitment agencies to recruitment portals; Example of ads linking to a third-party landing page to recruitment portals.
The ads used at least four tactics to evade scrutiny: First, AI-generated recruitment posters disguised as generic job postings that only reveal their military nature once clicked through. Second, French and Spanish language ads funnelling users to slick third-party landing pages hosted on an app-builder platform to harvest contact details. Third, the use of disposable, newly registered domains redirects to the real recruitment sites, a known technique to avoid tracking the final website (a method reminiscent of Doppelganger). Finally, fake but polished Facebook pages posing as legitimate staffing agencies to lend the whole operation a veneer of credibility.
Following the domains back to a command structure
The research traced dozens of recruitment websites back to a small set of groups behind them. At least 35 websites were identified, spanning up to 40 languages with dedicated domains for Brazil, Serbia, and the DRC. Behind this infrastructure are four recruitment brands: Military Staff Agency, Work in Russia, IRC Russian Bear, and Work Crew Agency. The first three are linked through shared WhatsApp contact details to a single Russia-registered organisation, “Central Headquarters,” itself co-located with a volunteer battalion training centre in Bashkortostan, Russia.
Image 3: (L to R), Russia’s military recruitment brands Military Staff Agency, Work in Russia, IRC Russian Bear, and Work Crew Agency
Image 4: (L to R, clockwise) Homepages of the portals of the IRC Russian Bear, Work Crew Agency, and Military Staff Agency.
Open source research also linked one Work Crew Agency domain to Roman Saponkov, a Russian military blogger already under Ukrainian sanctions for his role in backing the invasion, with a documented history of ties to the Wagner Group. Although a full attribution of the network to Russia is still pending, these cues transform a story about anonymous websites into one about assets and figures operating within a state-linked recruitment pipeline.
Volunteers, mercenaries and victims of deception
The digital network uncovered by the EEAS is only one part of the story. Recruits range from willing volunteers to people drawn by high salaries or deceived into travelling to Russia. Ex-military personnel and war veterans from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East willingly join, including former Syrian combatants lured by high salaries from Russian-linked recruiters. The Kremlin exploits poverty and desperation for geopolitical gain, contradicting its claims of supporting the Global South’s emancipation. A recent Human Rights Research Center report calls this a “predatory global recruitment infrastructure” exploiting economically vulnerable citizens.
Many never intended to join the Russian military at all. Thousands believed they were signing up to work as plumbers, warehouse packers, security guards or other roles in Russia, or, at best, in logistics or construction away from the front.
A Guardian report highlights a Nepali man, ‘Nandaram Pun,’ who was promised a job in Germany, told to travel via Russia, and was instead forced into the military and sent to fight in Bakhmut.
From social media advertisements to a military contract
The EEAS investigation mapped a coordinated, centralised campaign on Meta. Recruitment also takes place across TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, Discord, and gaming apps. Once contact is established, intermediaries such as influencers, middlemen or women, travel agencies or specially created companies coordinate travel logistics, often charging substantial fees offset by promised high salaries of up to $3,000. On arrival in Russia, recruits’ passports are taken away, and they are coerced into signing a contract with the Russian military, typically in Russian, a language they do not understand, before up to two weeks of military training at sites like the Avangard Academy near Moscow, before deployment to Ukraine.
When recruitment becomes human trafficking
The deceptive nature of this scheme has led many scholars and legal experts to conclude it is tantamount to human trafficking. A recent report by the International Federation of Human Rights finds that, legally, Russia is responsible for violations in this field, and third states can also be liable for failing to prevent trafficking, prosecute perpetrators, and repatriate victims.
Several Ukrainian initiatives aim to counter these tactics. The ‘I want to live’ project encourages members of the Russian armed forces to defect or surrender. Another effort, ‘Stop Russian Recruiters’, focuses on exposing predatory recruitment activities. This website reveals those involved in such deceptive practices globally, offers advice to the public on finding relatives missing in Russia, and aims to help them in escaping or surrendering safely to Ukrainian forces.
Governments push back
This has provoked significant backlash in recruits’ countries of origin. Nepal has prohibited citizens from travelling to Russia or Ukraine and demanded that Moscow return its nationals. In India, the controversy prompted high-level diplomatic efforts to repatriate all Indians from the front line.
As the pipeline from East Asia shrinks, the focus increasingly moves to Africa and Latin America. An INPACT investigation found at least 1,417 African citizens signed contracts with the Russian military between January 2023 and September 2025, likely an undercount, as Kenya’s National Intelligence Service has identified over 1,000 of its own nationals recruited. Cuba, along with Colombia, is a primary source for recruitment in Latin America, with Ukrainian military intelligence estimating 10,000 to 15,000 Cubans fighting in Russia’s ranks, with more than 1,000 identified by name. Other countries are also involved. Families of hundreds of deceived Peruvians have also protested outside Peru’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Embassy in Lima, demanding their relatives’ safe return.
A recruitment pipeline under pressure
As Russian casualty rates continue to increase, and bonuses shrink amid mounting economic troubles, recruitment numbers are declining. In February, backlash over Russia’s schemes prompted the Kremlin to ban the recruitment of citizens from 43 “friendly” countries, including China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela. This exposes a growing contradiction: Moscow presents itself as a partner of the Global South while exploiting economic hardship and sending deceived foreign workers into a war they may never have agreed to fight. As testimonies emerge, governments intervene, and recruitment networks are exposed, the risks of dealing with Russian recruiters are becoming harder to conceal.
