From Carvajal v. Ferretti, decided yesterday by the Florida Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Justice Mark Klingensmith, joined by Justices Shannon Shaw and Johnathan Lott:
Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2024), authorizes injunctions for protection against stalking. “Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” “Harass” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that:
- Causes substantial emotional distress; and
- Serves no legitimate purpose.
A “course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose….
Because the “harassment” must be “repeated[ ]” for an injunction to issue, at least two instances of “harassment” are required. Critically, “[t]wo or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment.” A qualifying course of conduct requires acts “separated by time or distance.”
The court overturned the injunction on the grounds that the incidents didn’t qualify as “a series of acts over time evidence continuity of purpose,” that they wouldn’t cause “substantial emotional distress” to a reasonable person, and that they “served legitimate purposes.” But it also had this to say more broadly, under the heading “Injunctions Are Not a Remedy for Interpersonal Conflict”:
The trial court’s ruling focused on the parties’ contentious relationship and the perceived impropriety of Girlfriend’s communications stemming from her involvement with husband and his personal affairs with Wife. Though Florida courts have repeatedly cautioned against this practice in other cases, the message bears repeating: stalking injunctions are not designed to regulate contentious personal disputes.
The law draws a firm—but still misunderstood—line between conduct that is unlawful and conduct that is simply unpleasant, offensive, or emotionally charged. That distinction becomes especially important in cases involving requests for injunctions against stalking, where courts are frequently asked to intervene in deeply personal disputes.
At first glance, it is easy to see why someone embroiled in an acrimonious relationship might turn to the courts for relief. Words are exchanged, accusations are made, reputations feel threatened, and emotions run high. The concern can be real. But the legal question is not whether the conflict is intense, it is whether the conduct meets section 784.048’s definition of “stalking.” And that definition is intentionally narrow.
Florida courts have long recognized that injunctions are extraordinary remedies, not tools for refereeing personal disputes…. [I]njunctions are not available “to stop someone from uttering insults or falsehoods.” That principle reflects a broader judicial reluctance to transform everyday conflict into legally actionable wrongdoing…. [I]njunctions are not meant “to keep the peace between parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along.” In other words, the law does not—and cannot—guarantee harmonious relationships.
This restraint is rooted first in section 784.048 itself. Section 784.048 does not prohibit rude behavior, social media arguments, or even harsh personal attacks. Instead, section 784.048 targets a specific kind of conduct: repeated, directed actions that cause 1) substantial emotional distress, and 2) serve no legitimate purpose. That standard excludes much of what occurs in interpersonal disputes. Arguments between neighbors, former romantic or business partners, disputes involving family members, and emotionally charged communications often arise from recognizable—if imperfect—human motives. Such communications may be regrettable, but are not necessarily unlawful.
Section 784.048’s requirement of “substantial emotional distress” further underscores this limitation. Courts evaluate distress using an objective standard, asking how a reasonable person would respond and not how the affected individual before the court subjectively felt…. [T]his standard is “narrowly construed.” The law assumes that reasonable people can withstand a certain level of friction, insult, and discomfort without requiring judicial intervention. Everyday emotions like embarrassment, anger, and anxiety are part of the human condition. Section 784.048 is concerned only with conduct that is so extreme it would overwhelm an ordinary person, not merely upset them.
Another important limitation is the concept of “legitimate purpose.” Human interactions, even contentious ones, often have underlying reasons. A message about child support, a demand to cease contact, or even a heated response to perceived wrongdoing may all serve legitimate ends…. [C]onduct does not lose its legitimacy simply because the conduct is accompanied by anger or hostility. This principle prevents section 784.048 from sweeping too broadly and ensures that courts do not penalize individuals for engaging in ordinary though less-than-perfect communication.
Overlaying all of this is a constitutional concern. Many interpersonal disputes are carried out through speech: texts, emails, social media posts. When a court issues an injunction restricting communication, the court is not merely resolving a dispute—it is limiting expression…. [S]uch orders can function as prior restraints on speech, which are viewed with deep skepticism under the First Amendment. If courts were to issue injunctions whenever speech was offensive or upsetting, they would risk suppressing protected expression and overstepping constitutional boundaries.
A practical dimension also exists. Courts are institutions designed to resolve legal disputes, not to manage ongoing personal relationships. If injunctions were available whenever a relationship deteriorated into hostility, the judicial system would become a forum for supervising human behavior at its most personal level. Courts are not in the business of monitoring arguments, policing tone, and adjudicating grievances that, while real, are not legal violations. The law resists this role. Instead, the law intervenes only when conduct crosses a defined threshold into repeated, harmful, and unjustified behavior.
Ultimately, the limitation serves an important purpose. By reserving injunctions for true stalking or harassment—by conduct that is repeated, malicious, and seriously distressing—the law preserves the remedy for those who genuinely need protection. At the same time, the law acknowledges a difficult truth: not all harmful interactions are legally remediable. Some conflicts must be managed outside the courtroom, through personal boundaries, social consequences, or other legal avenues better suited to address the dispute.
While a trial judge may understandably feel compelled to resolve the full scope of a bitter and emotionally charged dispute brought into court, the judge’s authority is not guided by sympathy or a desire to restore harmony, but by the limits of the law itself. The judiciary’s role is not to mediate every personal conflict or to impose civility where relationships have broken down, but to determine whether the specific legal standards established by the Legislature have been met…. [I]njunctions are not a means “to keep the peace between parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along,” nor are injunctions available simply to restrain offensive speech or interpersonal friction. However compelling the circumstances may appear, a judge must resist the temptation to act beyond those bounds and instead apply the law as written, granting relief only where the statutory requirements are satisfied….
