From Friday’s decision by Judge Nina Wang (D. Colo.) in Hessert v. Street Dog Coalition:
Plaintiff asks the Court to “[v]acate the reference to the standing order on AI as … not applicable and unconstitutional.” Plaintiff argues that the Court’s Standing Order improperly compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, violates his due process and equal protection rights, “encroaches upon” work product, and amounts to legislating from the bench. These arguments are without merit. This request is DENIED.
The challenged standing order on AI appears to be this one; it requires that,
Every filing shall contain an AI Certification regarding the use, or non-use, of generative AI (such as ChatGPT, Harvey.AI, or Google Gemini) in preparing the filing, signed by all individuals who contributed to the drafting of the filing. To the extent that generative AI was used in any drafting of the filing, each individual must certify that any language drafted by AI (even if later edited by a human) was personally reviewed by the filer or another human for accuracy and that all legal citations reference actual non-fictitious cases or cited authority.
Court rules of course routinely compel certain statements in briefs (e.g., certificates of service, word count certificates, disclosures of funding for amicus briefs, tables of contents, and so on) and routinely restrict statements in briefs or in trial (e.g., attempts to use inadmissible evidence, personal insults of opponents and of judges, and more). These rules are generally not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
“It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal.” What’s true for oral statements in the courtroom also applies to written filings.
Perhaps some hypothetical compulsions to express certain viewpoints, such as a mandate for all lawyers to include the Pledge of Allegiance in their briefs, might be unconstitutional (though I wouldn’t even say that categorically all viewpoint-based speech restrictions or compulsions in court are unconstitutional). But a requirement that filings disclose AI use is eminently permissible. (For Hessert’s contrary argument, see pp. 8-10 of his filing.)
Some other items from the decision:
Striking Judge Neureiter’s Order. In his Recommendation, Judge Neureiter cautioned Plaintiff “that suing a dozen individual board members or officers for supposed illegality by the non-profit organization on which they serve without a good faith, plausible basis for individual liability could result in sanctions. Plaintiff should carefully evaluate the risks of proceeding against the individual Defendants and consider whether pursuing the individual Defendants named in his Amended Complaint is a wise use of energy and resources.” Plaintiff asks the Court to “[s]trike the unsupported sanctions threat contained at ECF No. 104, p. 10, as premature and lacking any record support.” There is no basis for the Court to do so. If Plaintiff takes issue with Judge Neureiter’s advisement, he may file formal objections under Rule 72. This request is DENIED.
Restoration of Full Motion Title. Plaintiff next asks for “restoration of the full title of any truncated docket entry (e.g., ECF No. 110).” This request is not supported by any explanation or argument. To the extent Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the Clerk’s Office has included only portions of the title of certain filings in the CM/ECF docket entry, there is no basis for any relief here. This is a standard practice of the Clerk’s Office to conserve space on the docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(3) (stating that docket entries “must briefly show the nature of the paper filed” (emphasis added)). For example, the title of Plaintiff’s filing docketed at Doc. 110 is approximately 100 words long, and would take up an unusually large amount of space if the entire title were included in the CM/ECF docket entry. In making rulings in this case, the Court relies on the titles contained in the actual filings, not on the titles reflected on the CM/ECF docket. This request is DENIED….
Recusal. Plaintiff asks the Court to recuse from this case and to “[r]estrain from further contact with the plaintiff in any shape or form.” This request is DENIED as duplicative. The Court has already denied one recusal request, and another motion to recuse is currently pending. The Court will rule on Plaintiff’s February 27, 2026 recusal motion in due course. As Judge Neureiter has previously explained to Plaintiff, the District of Colorado is an extraordinarily busy judicial district, and filing duplicative motions will not result in Plaintiff getting an answer more quickly. Accordingly, Plaintiff is cautioned that the continuous filing of duplicative or frivolous motions may result in this Court imposing a filing restriction.
