A considerable portion of libertarian infighting seems to stem from the largely unrecognized fact that there are two different ways to interpret the non-aggression principle (NAP). On the surface, the NAP seems clear: aggression is wrong. But there is a deontological way to interpret this and a consequentialist way, and these interpretations are mutually exclusive.
Deontological reasoning argues people should refrain from acts of aggression, even if that leads to a less free society.
Consequentialist reasoning argues people should act to create as free a society as possible, even if that means using aggression.
Notice how both the deontological libertarian and the consequentialist libertarian would say they “hold to the NAP.” They both want a society free from aggression. But the truth is they hold two completely different principles despite calling them by the same name—a fact which leads to no shortage of confusion.
The libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick drew attention to this dichotomy in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia:
“For suppose some condition about minimizing the total (weighted) amount of violations of rights is built into the desirable end state to be achieved. We then would have something like a “utilitarianism of rights”; violations of rights (to be minimized) merely would replace the total happiness as the relevant end state in the utilitarian structure…This still would require us to violate someone’s rights when doing so minimizes the total (weighted) amount of the violation of rights in the society. For example, violating someone’s rights might deflect others from their intended action of gravely violating rights, or might remove their motive for doing so, or might divert their attention, and so on…In contrast to incorporating rights into the end state to be achieved, one might place them as side constraints upon the actions to be done: don’t violate constraints C. The rights of others determine the constraints upon your actions.”
The immigration debate is a good example of a situation where the two sides are talking past each other because they have different forms of the NAP in mind. Specifically, many libertarians object to open borders on the grounds that the new immigrants are likely to vote for expanded welfare programs, commit more violent crimes, and so on, so the result will be a decrease in the amount of freedom in society. This consequentialist approach is dumbfounding to those whose interpretation of libertarianism is “never commit aggression,” but it makes perfect sense if your principle is “create a society with the least amount of aggression possible—and use force to that end if necessary.”
Having said that, a rigid deontological approach isn’t the only way to push back against the consequentialist argument for border restrictions. There are also a couple of ways that one can grant consequentialism and still favor open borders.
One such approach would be to question whether the consequences will really be what the closed borders advocate expects them to be. For example, someone might argue that immigrants will actually vote for smaller welfare programs or commit fewer crimes, or at least will not meaningfully change the status quo on these fronts. It then becomes an empirical question whether open borders will increase or decrease freedom in these areas, and we will have to speculate about likely future outcomes based on data from the past.
If the data seem to point in the direction of open borders leading to less freedom in these areas, there is still another way for a consequentialist to advocate against border restrictions, and that is to question how we should weigh different kinds of freedom. One could argue that, while it’s true that immigrants will vote for more welfare and commit more crimes, the fact that the borders are open is an increase in freedom that more than offsets the decrease in freedom from the larger welfare programs and higher crime rate, so “on net” freedom has gone up.
Of course, the difficulty here is that there is no objective measure of “total freedom” in society, so the consequentialist calculus in cases where freedom increases in one area but decreases in another becomes highly subjective. Just as utilitarianism has difficulty figuring out whether “total happiness” has increased from a change that makes some people better off and others worse off, so a “utilitarianism of rights” runs into similar problems. As a result, consequentialist libertarians will often disagree among themselves about the ethics of a certain policy like open borders, even when they all agree on both consequentialism and on what the factual consequences will likely be.
The ultimate response is, as mentioned, to simply reject the consequentialist view altogether in favor of strict deontology. Open borders is the non-aggressive approach to borders, says the deontological libertarian, and if the consequence of that is less freedom in society, then so be it.
That may sound unreasonable to many who desire a free society, but the truth is both sides have bullets they need to bite. Assuming the pro-overall-freedom consequences of border restrictions are uncontested, the deontologist has to say, “You’re right, my moral prescription will probably lead to a less free society, but I think that’s the price of conducting ourselves ethically.” Meanwhile, the consequentialist has to say, “You’re right, I’m advocating for aggression here—even on a large scale—because I think it serves the greater good/more overall freedom. The ends justify the means.” Our debates on these issues would probably improve in quality if both sides were willing to name and bite their respective bullets right off the bat.
Whichever approach you personally prefer, we can all benefit from a clearer understanding of the range of positions that are out there and the reasons why people hold them. In many cases, a good way to improve that understanding is to ask our opponent, “What exactly do you mean by ‘the NAP?’”
