In 2003, when the U.S. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was formed its objective was presented bluntly: to “hasten the regime’s downfall.”
Their second report revealed in 2006 similarly concluded that the “implementation of the CAFC II recommendations will hasten the day Cubans will be free to elect their leaders.” This also included calls in “planning support for a Cuban Transition Government.”
By 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had committed more than $11 million to the Cuban Civil Society Support Program in an effort to implement the recommendations laid out five years earlier. The program’s objectives included creating “alternative means of mass communication” and “organized groups seeking common goals.”
To achieve this latter objective, a social media platform named ZunZuneo was established with the goal of facilitating the formation of social groups and improving the ability to coordinate and network.
The program—which cost roughly $1.7 million—was operated in secret, with the Denver-based company Mobile Accord helping develop and operate the platform under a grant from Creative Associates International.
Mobile Accord was led by CEO James Eberhard, who had priorly worked on other SMS communication projects abroad. In July 2010, he flew to Spain to discuss a “below the radar strategy” to obscure these connections to Washington.
The grant structure also created several layers between USAID and the platform itself: Mobile Accord was the organization awarded the grant to develop ZunZuneo, Creative Associates International helped administer the program, and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) managed the project through Creative Associates.
Through FOIA-released documents, ZunZuneo outlined its overall strategy noting that “technology has been revolutionizing democratic processes around the world by allowing ordinary citizens to be direct participants.”
Internal USAID grant documents reveal that in its initial stages the project also planned an “incubation” phase, which included selecting “influential Cuban people/groups” to help in network expansion.
ZunZuneo messages initially focused on topics such as sports, news, and public events to build its social platform. The AP, however, noted that internal planning documents showed the project was intended to become more politically focused, with draft messages reflecting this possible direction.
The ZunZuneo team tested its capacity during the 2009 “Peace Without Borders” concert in Havana, which the AP described as “a perfect opportunity to test the political power of their budding social network.” Contractors sent hundreds of thousands of text messages related to the event, including a poll asking whether two musicians who had fallen out of favor with the Cuban government should perform. The poll generated approximately 100,000 responses, which the project used to analyze user attitudes and engagement.
Following this test, Paula Cambronero, a researcher for Mobile Accord, began building a database of ZunZuneo subscribers that included demographic information such as gender, age, “receptiveness,” and “political tendencies.” USAID believed this information could help identify potential areas of support for political change and “maximize our possibilities to extend our reach” through other Cuba programs.
After USAID contractor Alan Gross was detained in Cuba in December 2009 while carrying out a separate communications project, concerns grew about the risks associated with work on the island. During a 2014 Senate hearing, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) argued that the timing made the program especially reckless as ZunZuneo was launched shortly after Gross’s arrest while he remained imprisoned in Cuba.
Regarding Washington’s involvement in the project, Mobile Accord stated that “there will be absolutely no mention of United States government involvement.” The company also created MovilChat, a Cayman Islands entity used to hold ZunZuneo’s assets and separate the platform from Mobile Accord.
With the assistance of Creative Associates, the project used around 500,000 Cuban phone numbers through an informal network, allowing ZunZuneo to quickly expand its reac. Internal project documents reported that the service had grown to more than 42,000 subscribers and 782 user-created groups—262 of which had at least ten members—by early 2011.
One of the more explosive reveals in the USAID documents is discussions of the idea of “smart mobs”—rapidly assembled groups coordinated through the platform. The Guardian relates how documents show USAID staff discussing how text messaging had led to “smart mobs” during revolutions in Moldova, the Philippines, and Iran.
The Associated Press, meanwhile, described the planning for ZunZuneo and how a single text would be able to reach thousands of users simultaneously. This included the potential for the platform to serve as a catalyst for a “Cuban Spring,” drawing comparisons to the role social media played in protests during the Arab Spring.
In a 2014 statement, USAID spokesperson Matt Herrick argued that the smart mobs “had nothing to do with Cuba nor ZunZuneo,” describing them as unrelated case-study research and brainstorming material. However, even if these passages were not the final operational plan for ZunZuneo, the fact that these ideas appeared in project discussions highlights U.S. efforts at the time to use communication technologies as tools for political change.
The Barack Obama administration defended the program, with White House spokesman Jay Carney stating that ZunZuneo was not an intelligence or covert program, while noting that discretion was required for its operation.
The Senate hearing also raised questions about who was responsible for creating the program. When Senator Leahy repeatedly pressed USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah on who had conceived ZunZuneo, Shah did not identify anyone, stating only it “was in place before I arrived.”
Cuban officials rejected that explanation. Josefina Vidal, director of U.S. affairs at Cuba’s Foreign Ministry, argued that “once again that the United States government has not renounced its plans of subversion against Cuba,” viewing ZunZuneo as an attempt to create instability in the country.
In the end, investigators found that a performance review conducted by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) remained labeled as a draft rather than finalized. Two OTI officials acknowledged this was intentional, stating that they believed keeping the document in draft form could prevent it from being subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
The Office of Inspector General also found that key legal communications, emails, and project records were incomplete or unavailable. Some emails were lost during USAID’s system migration, while other sensitive communications sent through Hushmail could not be recovered. As a result, investigators often had to rely heavily on interviews and testimonies to evaluate the program.
ZunZuneo had a limited shelf life as it ended in 2012 along with its grant funding. Still, similar efforts continued through Piramideo, an SMS-based social network launched by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting in 2013. The platform was designed to help Cubans share information and communicate without relying on government-controlled networks.
The perception in Cuba remained skeptical, with Hilda Arias, the director of Mobile Services at Cuba’s Telecommunication Company (ETECSA), linking Piramideo to ZunZuneo and raising concerns that the platform could increase support for opposition groups. With social media playing an important role in revolutions throughout the 2000s, Cuban concerns over the political influence of these platforms appeared understandable.
