From a decision last Tuesday in Doe v. Florida Bar by Magistrate Judge Robert Norway (M.D. Fla.):
Plaintiff argues that because this lawsuit challenges the actions of an “official arm of the Supreme Court of Florida,” Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed under a pseudonym. Plaintiff further argues that he should be permitted to utilize a pseudonym because his medical and psychological information would be disclosed publicly, and his personal safety would be at risk….
For more details, here’s an excerpt from Doe’s argument for pseudonymity:
This is a civil rights action against The Florida Bar and its officials, and against a sworn law enforcement deputy individually, arising in part from a disability accommodation request and denial, and in part from facts surrounding a domestic incident in which Plaintiff sought police assistance regarding a former intimate partner. Both categories of fact involve information the Eleventh Circuit has recognized as warranting protection through pseudonymous litigation….
Plaintiff’s claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Count IV, necessarily requires alleging that Plaintiff has autism, together with the medical and personal circumstances underlying Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Courts have consistently recognized medical and psychological information as information of the utmost intimacy supporting pseudonymity….
Plaintiff anticipates that Defendants may argue that Plaintiff waived any privacy interest in this information because Plaintiff voluntarily referenced his autism in a campaign social media post explaining his candidacy. That argument should be rejected. Disclosure in one limited context does not waive a privacy interest against disclosure in a different context to a different audience for a different purpose. See Doe v. Shawnee State Univ. (S.D. Ohio 2019) (rejecting argument that a transgender plaintiff could not claim a privacy interest in her transgender status because she had already disclosed it to her employer and coworkers, since the general public remained unaware).
The campaign post was Plaintiff’s own characterization, on his own terms, offered to explain his candidacy. What this litigation would create is materially different: a permanent, searchable public record in which Plaintiff’s name is tied to a disciplinary prosecution premised in part on treating that same disclosure as actionable conduct—precisely the kind of damaging, decontextualized characterization the original disclosure neither caused nor invited.
The factual background of a allegations directly related to Plaintiffs status as a domestic abuse survivor as an adult and child necessarily discloses that Plaintiff sought law enforcement assistance in connection with a former intimate partner and Plaintiffs First Amendment protected speech during that episode. Public docketing of these facts under Plaintiff’s true name would disclose the existence and details of that relationship and the circumstances of Plaintiff’s call for police assistance to the public at large, including to the former partner, creating a risk of harm independent of the litigation itself….
The court was unpersuaded:
Plaintiff’s interest in privacy does not outweigh the presumption of openness at this stage of the litigation. The nature of this case {see Civil Rights Corps v. LaSalle (2d Cir. 2026) (discussing public attorney disciplinary proceedings and explaining that it has been matters of public concern since the 1200s)} and the facts alleged do not compel any private information or put Plaintiff’s safety at personal risk. The mere fact that Plaintiff may have to disclose information to the Defendants during discovery in this matter is not a sufficient basis to allow Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym in this litigation….
Doe stated in filings that he had run for judge of Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit in the 2024 election cycle, and had autism; Stephen Brown ran in that election, and publicly stated that he “live[s] on the Autism spectrum.” He got 48.7% of the vote in the nonpartisan primary, running against the incumbent.
Doe also says he “did not qualify to run again in the 2026 judicial election,” partly because of the bar actions related to what he is suing over. This suggests that he might run again in the future, which further highlights the importance of the public being able to connect the lawsuit to the candidate, so as to better evaluate the candidate’s.
I e-mailed Mr. Brown, and he promptly responded, confirming that he was indeed Doe, and adding:
Just a very brief point of clarification: I firmly support open access to court records with the limited exception, in my case, of the basis of my ADA claim, which was (expectedly but not voluntarily) drawn to light against my will by actors who are not parties to these causes. I trust that you will handle the ADA with care.
Regarding the issues germane to your journalistic interests, I have been personally conflicted since requesting pseudonym status and have several times thought about withdrawing the request. I think all the other issues I have presented should be resolved fully in sight of the governed. My positions on the First Amendment and Open Courts are clearly and precisely (and repetitively) contained within the Court pleadings, to which I have sworn.
For more on Doe’s arguments about the alleged failure to accommodate, see his TRO motion. For still more, see Doe’s 268-page, 870-paragraph Amended Complaint.
