In Doe v. Jones, decided yesterday by Judge Thomas Durkin (N.D. Ill.), Doe sued her ex-boyfriend Jones for surreptitiously videorecording their sexual acts, and some friends of Jones’ for soliciting and further distributing the videos. The court allowed those claims to go forward, but it rejected Doe’s further claims against Jones’s parents as owners of the home where some of the behavior took place.
Here’s the court’s analysis as to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim:
Doe does not allege that the Homeowners engaged in any conduct that could feasibly be considered extreme and outrageous. In fact, the only specific conduct she alleges from either parent is that Jennifer contacted Doe to express her “devastation” for Doe and her “disappointment in [her son]’s actions.” That is not a tort.
Doe’s conclusory allegation that the Homeowners “knew or should have known” that their son was engaged in tortious conduct on his private cell phone lacks any plausible factual support. Doe argues that Jones Sr.’s role as a police officer means he would have extensive knowledge of criminal sexual assault and nonconsensual recording and disseminating videos. While that may be true, that alone certainly does not indicate he is automatically privy to the alleged illegal conduct of a third party. Doe has failed to plausible allege a claim of IIED against Jones Sr. and Jennifer. In fact, it is not even close.
The court held the same as to negligent infliction of emotional distress:
[The Homeowners] argue that they had no duty to Doe as homeowners just because their adult son, unbeknownst to them, harmed Doe in their home. There is no legal support for Doe’s claim to the contrary. Jones is not a minor. See 740 ILCS 115 (assigning liability to parents of a minor child).
And Doe does not allege that the house maintenance or layout put the Homeowners on notice that a nonconsensual recording that would later be disseminated would occur in their home. Further, the Homeowners argue that Doe did not suffer any requisite physical impact. Although Doe argues that she suffers from various mental health diagnoses, reputational harm, anxiety, sleep disruption, and feelings of “loneliness, guilt, and shame,” these are emotional injuries, not physical impacts.
And the court held the same as to premises liability:
Under the Illinois Premises Liability Act, owners owe a duty of “reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them” to entrants onto their property. A premises liability claim typically “arises from an injury attributable to an unsafe condition of the property itself.”
Premises liability requires proof of duty, breach, an injury proximately caused by the breach, “plus three additional elements—that there was a condition on the property that presented an unreasonable risk of harm, that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the condition and the risk, and that the defendant could reasonably have expected people on the property would not realize, would not discover, or would fail to protect themselves from the danger. If it is a landowner’s conduct or activity—as opposed to a dangerous condition on the property—that creates the injury-causing hazard, the claim is one of negligence, rather than premises liability.”
Doe readily concedes that “she can better plead her real-property based claims against Homeowners” and attempts to add a negligence claim in her response brief. But a plaintiff may not amend her complaint through arguments raised for the first time in an opposition brief. Therefore, the Court considers the premises liability claim as pled. Here, Doe alleges that Jones’s tortious conduct caused her injury—not a condition of the property—and therefore she has not stated a claim for premises liability.
Doe argues that the Homeowners “had a duty to ensure Plaintiff was not a victim of intentional torts on their property.” The problem with Doe’s argument is that she doesn’t cite any authority to support such liability. The cases she cites are inapposite; they concern the heightened duty business owners owe to patrons and patrons who are harmed by the unforeseeable criminal or tortious actions of third parties in negligence cases… “Illinois imposes no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third parties unless a special relationship exists between the parties” such as a business owner and customer ….
This case is not about patrons of a business. It is about owners of a private residence. And Doe has not cited any authority that homeowners are liable for criminal or tortious activity on their property that they were unaware of. If this is all that Doe has against the Homeowners, they should not have been sued and been forced to defend this lawsuit.
The Homeowners are dismissed from the case. If Doe believes she can cure any of the deficiencies identified by the Court, she may file an amended complaint by August 24, 2026. Doe should carefully consider Rule 11(b) if she intends to amend her complaint as to the Homeowners. Suing individuals because they have a homeowner’s insurance policy or are collectible defendants is not a proper purpose for a lawsuit.
Krista Krepp represents the parents.
