From E.B. v. Kimi Crush Ltd., decided Thursday by Judge Michelle Peterson (W.D. Wash.):
On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff E.B. filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, bringing Washington state law claims alleging that Defendants Kimi Crush Limited …, Ant Hive Creations, Inc. …, Prinsloo Global Group, Inc. …, JoyBox Studio Limited …, and Starfish Technology Limited … operated illegal online casino games. Plaintiff states that she is a criminal defense attorney who faces reputational and professional harm if her diagnosed gambling addiction becomes known….
Plaintiff requests to proceed under the pseudonym E.B. to “(i) maintain her privacy when disclosing personal and highly sensitive details, such as her diagnosed gambling addiction; and (ii) protect her from the significant risk of professional and reputational harm[.]” …
A party’s use of a fictitious name or pseudonym runs counter to “the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings and Rule 10(a)’s command that the title of every complaint ‘include the names of all the parties[.]'” Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit “permit[s] parties to proceed anonymously when special circumstances justify secrecy.” Proceeding under a pseudonym is permissible when “necessary … to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.” …
The Court finds Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of the “need for anonymity to at least warrant provisionally granting her leave to continue pseudonymously until Defendants have appeared.” … Plaintiff contends she risks substantial social and professional stigma should her gambling addiction become public knowledge. She raises reasonable concerns that this would affect her ability to attract and retain clients.
The Court also finds, at this stage, that the public has a limited interest in learning Plaintiff’s identity. While the public has an interest in the matters being litigated, it is unclear how disguising Plaintiff’s identity would obstruct public scrutiny of the important issues in this case.
Finally, without any defendant having appeared in this case, it is too early to assess the prejudice to Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff states she will share her identity with them during discovery. The Court will therefore defer considering prejudice to Defendants and the availability of mitigating procedures until it has the benefit of Defendants’ arguments. Accordingly, the Court PROVISIONALLY GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Pseudonymously….
I can understand why plaintiff wouldn’t want to “[p]ublicly link[] her name to a gambling addiction diagnosis and six-figure losses,” because it “would directly threaten her ability to attract clients and sustain her practice.” I just don’t think that her desire to keep this secret should outweigh the public’s ability to supervise what the court does in this case—and indeed prospective clients’ ability to decide whether to trust a lawyer who has this problem.
Indeed, the E.B. decision seems inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit nonprecedential decision in Roe v. Skillz, Inc.(9th Cir. 2021), which came out the opposite way on very similar facts, rejecting pseudonymity for someone who said she was a gambling addict and argued “that disclosure could negatively affect her professional standing, as her employer is unaware of her struggles and her work requires interaction with the public who may ‘weaponize’ it against her.” Generally speaking, “That a plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic harm is not enough” to allow her to proceed pseudonymously (Doe v. Megless(3d Cir. 2011)); pseudonymity “has not been permitted when only the plaintiff’s economic or professional concerns are involved” (M.M. v. Zavaras (10th Cir. 1998), quoting National Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs (10th Cir.1989)).
Moreover, courts have mostly rejected pseudonymity as to claims of drug and alcohol addiction, though some courts have disagreed (see nn. 302-05 and accompanying text in The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation). And some courts have concluded that pseudonymity is particular inapt for would-be class representatives—which E.B. seeks to be here—because it “may … preclude potential class members from properly evaluating the qualifications of the class representative,” though here too others have disagreed (see nn. 155-156 and accompanying text). E.B. further adds to this disagreement.
